THE BATTLE OF LATEMA REATA HILL

MARCH 11 – 12, 1916 latema-Reata, Taveta,  Kenya

 “DO NOT BE AFRAID OF TRYING ANYTHING NINETY-NINE TIMES, IF THERE IS A CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING AT THE HUNDREDTH”

  

Many lessons, though costly were learnt at Eldorobo Salaita hill, the British knew why the assault failed and the Germans got to know the areas to improve on, the determination of their opponents and the cost should they have lost. The mountain was to be renamed slaughter, chilling enough to instil fear and be a reminder of difficult times.  But that done it was not enough to stop another attack under the same commands, similar terrain, same year in the month of March, the battle of LATEMA-REATA.

From his account in the book “MY REMINECENCES OF EASTAFRICA” Gen VON-Lettow writes of hostile spies. They were called “Shenzi” innocent looking locals. They were spying the Usambara railways and as a proof of having reached their objective they were to bring back to their masters part of Railway line. They deciphered the enemy was making a detailed reconnaissance of the Usambara railway and approaches to it. The usambara railway was the Germans principal line of communication. A look at a map showed that if the enemy advanced from Salaita and Longido enroute to new Moshi they stood the risk of losing Kilimanjaro country.

Due to anticipation of this assault, the Salaita position following its earlier successes was maintained but with a lesser force. German forces moved south to Latema-Reata hills. By March 8, 1916 the two major positions were manned by Major George Kraut who had earlier successfully defended Salaita hill. General Malleson of the British forces was faced with a new problem despite similarities in circumstances to the Salaita battle, two hills covered with dense vegetation that became worse as one ascended.

The first attack began on March 11, 11:45am. Brigadier Malleson flesh from defeat at salaita had at his disposal the 1^st East Africa Brigade for the operation consisting of, Belfield’s Mounted scouts, Mounted infantry company, No’s 6 and 8 field batteries, no 184 Howitzer battery, 2^nd Rhodesian Regiment, 3^rd Kings African Rifles, 130^th King Georges own Baluchis, a machine gun battery of the Loyal North Lancashires and volunteer machine gun company.

Malleson ordered his men on a frontal attack on Latema hill. A deception attack was not possible due to dense vegetation and a swamp on the south. The Rhodesian regiment was held in reserve while The Baluchis and 3rd Kings African Rifles went to attack holding the right and left positions respectively. The attack was supported by Artillery which bombarded German positions from arrange of 3,000 yards.

Major Kraut reported from Reata that hostile forces were moving towards his direction from Taveta. An attack was made by several thousands of men on the three German companies holding this position. The enemy suffered heavy losses and reported hundreds of stretchers were used to ferry the wounded and by evening the enemy attack had been repulsed with heavy losses. In the darkness captain kohl’s forces had pursued the enemy with energy and opened machine gun fire inflicting further casualties on their enemy when he tried to make a stop. After the attack failed, Malleson requested to be relieved from his command position due to sickness.

Gen Mallesons position was taken over by Brig. Gen Tighe who ordered a second assault. That night Krauts detachment telephoned again that the enemy had attacked with great force and penetrated his position. The Rhodesians and the Kings African Riffles were the leading units, the 130^th Baluchus covering the right flank and the 9^th and 5^th Field batteries supporting the attack. Among the casualties was the commander of the Kings African Rifles, Lieutenant-Colonel B R Graham. Early in the morning of 12^th Kraut found some of his detachment on their positions on Reata Mountains. The enemy had fallen back to Taveta.  Lots of confusion had occurred at night during the close quarter battles. Despite heavy losses on the German side the British had many casualties, and the wounded were moved without a hitch.

The British would make the third attack forcing the enemy to concede defeat, under Tighe’s command the 7^th Southern Africa Regiments would attack at night with their Bayonets fixed. The south Africans’ managed to find their way up the two hills, in the darkness and confusion  Gen  Tighe lost control of the units and fearing heavy losses ordered a retreat at 0430Hrs. But when the patrols reached the heights of the hill to convey the order they found, Lieutenant-Colonel Freeth and Major Thompson at the summit and in command, the Germans were in a full retreat. The British consolidated this position to be their strong hold.