Salaita is near
modern day Taveta town, Kenya, it is a sun
baked hill in isolation, were it not for occasional cartridges,
unexploded ordinance and trenches very
little gives it away as a scene that has witnessed a major historical
battle. It
was a strategic look out post and major base for German railway
communication
and an important tactical point for the British ambitions to penetrate
German
East Africa. British intelligence showed it was defended by a small
detachment
of 300 men with no artillery, an error that would cost them dearly. The
British
command tasked to attack Salaita was led by brigadier General Beve’s 2nd
South African Infantry brigade
and first East African brigade. In addition was the Indian artillery
brigade, in
total there were 6000 men.
The allied forces began their assault on the morning of
February 12 1916 with the bombardment of German positions on the hill.
Unknown to them Salaita hill was highly
defended by approximately 1,300 men under the command of local commander
Major
George kraut. Due to poor intelligence they attacked trenches and
positions in
the summit, instead of the front lines further downhill. It alerted the
Germans
of the impending attack with little disorganisation or determent of
their
ability to repulse the enemy.
Allied forces with aerial support began to advance at 0500
hrs, supported by scouts, armoured cars, artillery and machine guns.
After
0700hrs, 2 KM short of Salaita, Beve’s brigade assumed a loose
formation; they
came under sporadic fire from the enemy artillery. The brigadier
deployed the 7th
SA Infantry Regiment (Lt. Col. J. C. Freeth) leading. 5th SA Infantry
Regiment
(Lt. Col. the Honourable J. J. Byron) echeloned on its left and the 6th
SA Infantry Regiment (Lt. Col. G. M. J. Molyneux) extending on the
right. They
penetrated the core positions of the enemy but were forced to withdraw
due to
heavy enemy fire. While withdrawing they were attacked on the right wing
by the
German relieving force commanded by Captain Schultz from Taveta, the
brigades
withdrew with some disorder to the northeast, having sustained 172
casualties.
One of the principle reasons for the reverse is the lack of coordination
between the South African and East African brigades. Their respective
attack
time had a difference of over 3 hours despite the fact they had a common
target.
The South African
losses at Salaita hill are given as 138, 83 were from the leading unit
the 7th
SA Infantry,6 killed,47 wounded and 30 missing.
A similar account was given by Gen
Von-Lettow
Vorbeck, leader of the German East Africa forces. In his book
“REMINISCENCES OF
EAST AFRICA” he recounts of considerable build up of troops to the East
of
mount Eldorobo. Mount Eldorobo would later after the battle be renamed
Slaughter and corrupted to modern day Salaita. He beleaved the
considerable
build up was to train young European fighters from South Africa of how
to manoeuvre
and engage the enemy in the bush. He recounts how early in February the
enemy
advanced from the East with several regiments. He had plans the enemy
would not
get away, he would achieve this by means of a counter attack with
Captain
Schulz detachment in Taveta. On 12th
February 1916, European troops advanced to 300 meters from Oldorobo
Mountains. Head quarters
at new Moshi considered an opportunity had presented its self and
ordered fire
to be opened. Schultz detachment was ordered to match from the rear and
make a decisive
attack on the enemy’s right or northern wing. He was to be later
informed that
the enemy had been repulsed with heavy losses. The numerous Howitzers
shells
that fell on their position hardly did any damage. The enemy retreated
through
the bush in disorder. They buried more than 60 Europeans. According to
the
prisoners of war and recovered documents the troops were 3 South African
infantry Brigades and It seemed the men were recruited on the promise of
acquiring
farms and plantations.